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Abstract: 
 
The scientific investigation goal of this paper is to analyze the convergence of social 
protection indexes within the EU-15 member states. More specifically, we employ a panel 
data analysis, testing certain hypotheses of welfare convergence upon the 15 EU Member 
States, for the years 1990 to 2009, by considering three specific factors. GDP growth rate is 
used first as a proxy for the financial capacity of the system, while unemployment provides, 
next, a broader picture of the demand for social security benefits. Finally, the dependency 
ratio is used as a proxy of the countries’ socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, 
certain other exogenous factors reflecting economic integration are considered also. Panel 
data estimations confirm the existence of conditional β-convergence of social expenditure in 
EU-15 countries, with unemployment, dependency ratio and GDP growth having a 
significant impact upon the growth of social protection expenditure. With respect to specific 
external factors, the existing evidence is less clear. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the established economic theory of convergence, the economic 
development level of LDC’s (Less Developed Countries) should approach the 
advanced countries level with the same economic resources
2
. Therefore, we need to 
investigate the levels of social protection expenditures that characterize the social 
convergence process among EU countries. In this work, then, we evaluate the 
presence of convergence in social protection (SP) in the EU-15 case, and identify the 
most significant conditional macro-economic factors that while influencing this 
convergence process, perform, in fact, differently between sets of EU countries. To 
this very purpose, we select a set of basic macro-economic variables most 
commonly applied in similar research, namely: GDP growth rate, unemployment 
and the dependency ratio.  
 
We are certainly much worried about the upcoming European welfare status issue, 
given the significance of a downward convergence in state welfare provisions due to 
serious and unfettered market forces and increased global competition. In other 
words, it is here also assumed that both the risk of capital flight and outsourcing will 
develop into a “race to the bottom” in regulatory competition within the integrated 
economies of the European Union so that the current welfare state may have to carry 
the burden of economic austerity (Tanzi, 2002; Montanari et al., 2007; Liapis et al., 
2013). Summarizing here, we can say that there is not much of a consensus in 
welfare state literature about the question of convergence or non-convergence and its 
underlying determinants, to the best, in fact, of our knowledge. 
 
The aim of the paper is first, to analyze the social protection convergence issue 
within the EU-14, (the EU-15 excluding Luxembourg), second, to show the 
dynamics of social protection expenditure in the European Union as a whole, and in 
two distinct groups of countries the Southern EU-4 countries (Greece, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal) and the remaining Northern EU-10 countries, third, using panel data 
estimations to examine the welfare incidence of country’s economic growth, 
unemployment rate, country’s openness and national debt finally, to examine 
                                                 
1
 Following Sala-i-Martin (1996a), absolute β-convergence implies that incomes across 
countries approach the same steady state level; whereas, conditional convergence implies 
that different economies converge to different steady state levels depending on cross section 
differences in savings rates, technology, population growth, etc. 
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whether or not the convergence inference remains robust independently of the 
protection index used
3
. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II exposes briefly the β-convergence 
concept, Section III presents the dynamics of Social Protection Expenditure in the 
EU-10 and the EU-4 (1990-2009), Section IV analyzes our modeling approach and 
the relevant data used, next Section V describes our research results and, last Section 
VI, presents our concluding comments and further research suggestions. 
 
2. The Convergence Hypothesis and Relevant Background 
 
In the growth literature, two fundamental notions of convergence are the “absolute” 
and the “conditional” convergence. Applied to social protection, “absolute” 
convergence implies that there is an underlying common steady level of per-capita 
welfare expenditure to which nation-specific policies are converging.  If so, there 
must be an inverse relationship between the initial value of per capita social 
expenditure and its growth rate. In fact, if β-convergence holds for all i nations 
(i=1,2,...M), the welfare dynamics can be expressed according to the well-known 
relationship:  
                                (1) 
 
where, the left-hand side is the average annual growth rate of social protection 
expenditure in country i at time T, α is a constant term and ε is the error term. The 
parameter β is a measure of β-convergence. If this assumption is checked for welfare 
expenditures, then it would indicate that countries with initially low levels of SP 
expenditure would experience faster SP expenditure growth than countries whose 
levels of expenditures have reached a certain stage of maturity. It follows that, 
regardless of their economic, social and institutional characteristics, all countries in 
the sample converge to the same steady state.  
 
“Conditional” convergence implies differentials in a country’s steady state level 
based on cross section differences in factors as the dependency ratio, unemployment 
rate, economic growth, etc.   
 
Alonso et al. (1998) were the first to test the assumptions of σ and β−convergence in 
the field of social protection. Based on cross-sectional and panel data estimations for 
11 countries of the ΕU, over the period 1966-92, the authors show a certain degree 
of convergence of per capita social protection expenditures, for the two sub-periods 
1966-74, 1978-86 and 1986-1992 and a process of divergence for the remaining sub-
period 1974-1978. 
                                                 
2
Luxembourg was excluded as it is typically considered an outlier. 
titiTtti yag ,,,,   
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We mention here also the work of Attia & Berenger (2009), who questioned the 
existence of convergence among the different social welfare systems in Europe and 
the impact of the Maastricht Treaty upon this social process. Social protection is 
viewed with reference to pensions, health and employment. Their conclusions are 
straightforward that the welfare state in Europe is receding, calling upon market 
solutions and mechanisms, where the social convergence process seems quite clear 
within the Union itself. Since EU stands up as a strong player in the globalized acute 
competition, it is evident that, after Maastricht, Europe itself accepted the fact that 
the economic and monetary union imposes a very strict budgetary constraint, which 
in fact makes all welfare expenses even more difficult to meet.  
 
Caminada et al. (2010) applied several σ and β convergence tests, using a set of 
social protection indicators, namely social expenditures, replacement rates of 
unemployment benefits, social assistance benefits and poverty indicators.  They 
found strong convergence of social expenditure in EU countries, over long time 
periods; whereas, this strong convergence seems to have stagnated in recent years. 
Moreover, they also conclude that replacement rates of unemployment benefits 
clearly converge to a higher level, but social assistance benefits and poverty rates do 
not show any convergence trend.  
 
In a broader picture, Starke et al. (2008) examined whether OECD welfare states 
have converged ever since 1980. Their findings are that although there is evidence 
of moderate welfare state convergence, it is in fact quite limited in magnitude. It is 
also quite varying in directionality and contingent upon the scientific indicator under 
examination. Their important outcome is that there is no strong evidence either for a 
“race to the bottom” or for the “Americanization of the Social Policy”, the two most 
common convergence scenarios. Their main finding ends up to that most measures 
are indicative of convergence and, in particular, that this holds for the various 
indicators of social expenditure, which exhibits an upwards trend over time. What 
needs special attention here, with respect to the aforementioned research and ours as 
well, is the clear claim of the authors that although they can herald limited 
convergence at best, they cannot reject the interesting possibility of the emergence 
of regional “convergence clubs” as it seems to be our research case here (i.e. the EU-
15 case, indeed). 
 
In this direction, Corrado et al. (2003) use fixed effects and composed coefficients 
models based on the inclusion of dummy variables to reflect the interaction between 
country specific factors and welfare policies. 
 
Last, but not least, we mention the work of Bouget (2003) where he stresses most 
emphatically, the very ambiguous evidence of convergence due to many 
methodological problems and difficulties of interpretation of the social indicators. 
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Moreover, he supports the idea of “adjustment” reforms rather than the existence of 
radical changes in the transitional period examined (1980-1998).  
 
In fact, the differences between welfare states can be established using a number of 
indicators, each of them focusing on a certain aspect of the welfare state. Paetzold 
(2012) investigates the convergence of welfare state indicators in Europe, applying 
panel data analysis. He relied upon pension and unemployment net replacement 
rates, as well as on public social expenditures, as particular social – welfare 
indicators, using a sample of 14 EU economies (EU-15, excl. Lux.), between 1980 
and 2005. His empirical findings reveal a convergence process, with strong cutch up 
characteristics of social protection levels in the Southern States. But, our research 
interest here is to question “what scientific perspective lies behind Paetzold’s 
particular selection of these social protection indicators, while analyzing the quite 
important welfare convergence issue among EU member states?”, given the very 
serious opposing propositions that exist (see Iversen and Cusack 2000; Taylor-
Gooby 2004 from one side and, Huber and Stephens 2001, Pierson 1996; Korpi and 
Palme 2003, on the other; as Paetzold also develops his arguments, p. 2).  
 
The main point is that he, quite clearly, acknowledges that given the all serious 
institutional differences among European States, he needs to pursue an analytical 
strategy that is based upon the convergence of welfare efforts and outputs (Paetzold, 
p. 2). This approach, he claims, follows the welfare convergence analysis 
proposition that it may not be all that important if institutional designs are that 
different, as long as they deliver similar outcomes.  
 
We further agree to this significant proposition and employ this fundamental 
research direction here. Moreover, we also fully agree to his research direction in 
that we too try to provide a first step analysis towards the application of the state-of-
the-art econometric techniques on data including certain replacement rates; while, 
quite obviously, many further analysis’ steps are definitely needed in the near future.  
We further note here that several groups among these countries are related, in 
general, to disparate levels of wealth, different social protection systems, 
demographic idiosyncrasies, unemployment rates and other relevant economic 
factors. These factors in perspective, we try to include as fundamentally 
representative of the social protection convergence issue, within the EU-14 research 
case here, by placing particular emphasis upon the role of the GDP growth rate, as a 
proxy for the financial capacity of the system, unemployment as a proxy for the 
demand for social security benefits and the dependency ratio as a proxy for the 
country’s socio-demographic characteristics.  
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3. The Dynamics of Social Protection Expenditure in the EU-10 and the EU-4 
(1990-2009) 
 
Our analysis focuses upon two specific indicators of social protection (SP) 
expenditure: the social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP (SPGDP) and 
the per capita social expenditure (SPPC), at PPS units and constant prices (2000), 
both expressed in a logarithm form, from a sample of 14 EU Member States over the 
period 1990-2009. These two particularly chosen indicators measure the level of 
(SP) according to two different approaches. Namely, in our first approach, (SPGDP) 
indicates the effort carried out by a country, with  regard to the (SP)  in terms of the 
share of the national wealth devoted to SP. In our second approach, (SPPC) is 
expressed at PPS and constant prices that can be designated as an indicator of the 
level of well-being and protection of a country’s inhabitants. Viewed in this way, 
SPGDP can then be interpreted as an indicator of means; whereas, SPPC can be 
conceived as an indicator of outcomes (See also Attia and Valérie Berenger p. 474)
4
. 
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of the average countries' growth rate of per-capita 
social protection expenditure (vertical axis) versus the initial per-capita Social 
Protection expenditure (horizontal axis) for the period 1990-2009. The inverse 
association between the initial per capita Social Protection expenditure and its 
annual growth rate indicates that, countries with initially low levels of SP 
expenditure experienced faster SP expenditure growth than countries whose levels 
of expenditures have reached a certain stage of maturity. More specifically, as 
“extreme cases” appear Portugal and Ireland reporting the highest annual growth 
rate 5.4% and 5.3%, whereas, Sweden and Netherlands present the lowest 1.3% and 
1.4% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Even though these two particular indicators are obviously linked, they do not need to 
coincide inevitably, because their divergence can reveal the influence of the GDP per capita. 
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 Figure 1: Real Pc Social Expenditure and its Growth in EU-14, 1990-2009 
 
 
      Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
As it concerns the Social Protection expenditure in the European Union as a whole, 
shows a significant increase during the period 1990-2009. In terms of per capita 
level, social protection seems to move in a parallel way in the two groups of 
countries (Figure 2a). 
 
Contrary, investigating the behavior of the social expenditure in terms of percentage 
of GDP, two distinct patterns of movement can be seen. More than that, it seems that 
a catching up convergence indicator exists by the Southern EU States, considering 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy (more or less) altogether as a group (Figure 2b). 
This EU group of countries experienced a significant improvement with the social 
protection expenditure as percentage of GDP rising from 17.2% of GDP in 1990 to 
25.8% in 2009. The respective movement in the South Europe presents ups and 
downs. It seems that adhesion to Maastricht criteria led politician decision makers to 
implement fiscal consolidation programs causing a slowdown in social expenditures 
after 1993. It is also clear that, especially in the years of global crisis, an upward 
trend in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in South as well as in North 
Europe can be seen, partly due to the decrease of GDP and partly to the increased 
demand for social security benefits conditioning by a rise in the unemployment rate. 
However, the significantly higher increase of Social Expenditure as percentage of 
GDP -ratio of Social Protection expenditure to GDP- in South Europe, must be seen 
by caution, as it may be attributed mainly to lower growth rates of GDP in this 
group of countries after 1990 and not to a rise in Social Protection expenditure.   
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          Figure 2a. SPPC                       Figure 2b. SPGDP  
 in EU-10 & EU-4, 1990-2009            in EU-10 & EU-4, 1990-2009 
              
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4. Econometric Framework and Model Specification 
 
The main question to answer is whether there is an empirical evidence of a catching 
up process towards a single welfare state regime in EU-14. To analyze whether there 
is any convergence in per capita as well as in terms of percentage of GDP welfare 
expenditure in EU-14 countries, we test the β-convergence hypothesis using panel 
data techniques
5
.  
 
The superiority of panel data methods over cross-country growth regressions has 
been stressed (Islam, 1995). The panel data analysis is also preferred as it takes into 
account the heterogeneity into the units of analysis by allowing individual-specific 
                                                 
5
 The first research efforts on convergence are cross-sectional studies that generally support 
the “Convergence Hypothesis” (Baumol, 1980; De Long, 1988; Grier and Tullock, 1989; 
Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996b). Time series convergence 
tests focus upon the notion of “Stochastic Convergence” where per capita income disparities 
among economies should follow a stationary process (Bernard & Durlauf, 1995; 1996). 
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variables (Frees, 2004) and, it can additionally capture the influence of certain 
periods in which there was an unusual growth performance, such as economic 
recession associated with financial crisis, by including dummy variables in the panel 
regression
6
.  
 
With respect to specification choice, we comparatively use the Pooled OLS, the 
Fixed Effects and the Random effects model. However, we have to consider several 
things that can make OLS biased in panel data models. This model implies that the 
intercepts and each of the slopes for all equations are the same and that the omitted 
factors are not correlated with one another and that they have the same variability. In 
other words, there is no autocorrelation and the variances are homoscedastic. 
Otherwise, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity produce bias in standard error 
estimates, leading to incorrect statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, 
fixed effect model and random effect model can be used (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Fixed effect model assumes that independent variable and error term is correlated, 
while random effect model assumes that error term is independently and identically 
distributed. However, there could be bias in estimation if correlation between fixed 
effect and independent variable exists. Therefore, appropriate model has to be 
decided based on Hausman test that compares fixed effect and random effect 
models. If the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between independent 
variable and error term is rejected through Hausman test, fixed effect model is more 
appropriate. Random effect model can be used when the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, which means that there is no such correlation. 
 
In line with the arguments of Hsiao (1981), Baltagi (1995) and Greene (2000), the 
choice of fixed effects option is more appropriate when research focuses on a 
specific set of N countries, which are not drawn randomly from a large population, 
they share a few common characteristics and, outcomes of the study are viewed as 
conditional upon this set of countries, that is a situation which precisely reflects our 
convergence study here. 
 
In this work, in a first step, we include three kind of domestic factors. The first 
factor corresponds to the economic growth rate (GDP) determining the financial 
capacity of the system. Our second factor is the unemployment rate (UNEM) 
depending upon the employment picture and conditioning the demand for social 
                                                 
6
 Panel data research supports, in general, the convergence hypothesis (Islam, 1995; Caseli et 
al., 1996; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001; Bassanini et al., 2001; Sarajevs V., 2001; Borys et 
al., 2008; Cuaresma et al., 2008, Szeles and Marinescu, 2010). 
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security benefits. Our third factor accounts for the socio-demographic 
characteristics, represented by the dependency ratio (DR). According to the 
literature, this variable should have a positive impact on the growth of the welfare 
expenditures, because a rise in this ratio due to demographic aging increases the 
proportion of the voters demanding social transfers (Lindert, 1996; Alsasua et al., 
2007). In a second step, to condition the model on the different welfare regimes, we 
included interaction terms which try to examine the effect of the welfare regimes on 
the SP expenditure dynamics. All countries have been grouped on the basis of the 
Esping-Andersen (1990), classification of welfare states as follows: 
 
Liberal (UK, IRL); 
Social-Democratic (SWE, NOR, DNK, FIN); 
Corporatist (AUT, BEL, GER, LUX, NLD, FRA); 
Southern-European (ITA, ESP, PRT, GRC). 
Accordingly then the specification used is the following: 
 
                                                                                                                  (2) 
 
In Table 2 variable description together with the data sources are presented. 
 
 
Table 1. Variables Description and Data Sources 
 
SPPC Per capita, Social Expenditure, at constant prices (2000) and constant PPP (2000), $ OECD 
SPGDP Social Expenditure as percentage of GDP OECD 
DR Age dependency ratio (%of working-age population) OECD 
UNEM Unemployment, total (%of total labour force) WB 
GDP Real per capita GDP at constant prices (2005) UNCTAD 
DSPC DS* SOCEXPPC (Socialdemocratic group effect)  
DLPC DL* (Liberal group effect)   
DSEPC DSE* SOCEXPPC (Southern European group effect)   
DSGDP DS* SOCEXGDP (Socialdemocratic group effect)  
DLGDP DL* SOCEXGDP (Liberal group effect)   
DSEGDP DSE* SOCEXPGDP (Southern European group effect)   
DUM 2008 Dummy for the year 2008 to account for the global crisis  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Unit Root Test for Panel Data 
 
Because our data is a panel data set, we perform unit root test for panel data to avoid 
spurious regression. There is a variety of tests suggested by various economists in 
the literature. In this paper, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Statistic, ADF-Fisher Chi-
   Investigating Social protection Convergence in the EU-15:  
                                                    A Panel Data Analysis                                    89 
 
Square and PP-Fisher Chi-Square tests were used to check whether the panel data 
contain unit roots. The results suggest that, per capita SP expenditure, SP 
expenditure as percentage of GDP and Unemployment variables are integrated to 
order one, so we used them in first differences. Also, dependency ratio and GDP per 
capita are used in second differences.    
 
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
 Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
Variable Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
SPPC  6.34880  1.0000  9.48631  0.9996  20.9930  0.8256 
Δ(SPPC) -5.81694  0.0000  87.4769  0.0000  86.9465  0.0000 
SPGDP  1.62175  0.9476  24.3957  0.6605  36.3957  0.1328 
Δ(SPGDP) -2.67932  0.0037  52.4838  0.0034  49.6423  0.0071 
DEPEND_RATIO -0.61650  0.2688  70.9323  0.0000  58.4071  0.0006 
Δ(DEPEND_RATIO) -1.21872  0.1115  40.7477  0.0566  25.6332  0.5932 
Δ2(DEPEND_RATIO) -2.49934  0.0062  64.5067  0.0001  16.0349  0.9653 
UNEMPL -1.91395  0.0278  46.4430  0.0157  27.4707  0.4927 
Δ(UNEMPL) -5.09474  0.0000  76.4818  0.0000  65.2232  0.0001 
GDP_PC -1.65156  0.0493  36.5060  0.1302  10.9458  0.9984 
Δ(GDP_PC)  0.69657  0.7570  23.5628  0.7044  13.0871  0.9925 
Δ2(GDP_PC) -2.93116  0.0017  59.6067  0.0005  67.1430  0.0000 
 
Testing for Convergence 
 
Applying panel data analysis, our estimates here employ annual data. The results of 
the absolute welfare convergence are reported in Table 3 that compares the Pooled 
OLS, the fixed effect and the random effect estimates. Fixed effects are tested by the 
incremental F test, while random effects are examined by the Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the 
pooled OLS regression is favored. The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) 
compares fixed effect and random effect models.  
 
Absolute Convergence 
 
Dependent variable here is the rate of variation of per capita Social expenditure. 
With the exception of the Fixed Effects model where the estimated coefficient is 
insignificant, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable being 
negative and significant provides evidence of absolute convergence. According to 
the tests appearing in the Table below, the Pooled OLS seems to be the appropriate 
model (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Absolute Convergence in EU-14, 1990-2009  
 
 Dependent variable: Δ_l_SPPC 
Independent variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
constant 0,3186*** 0,1873 0,3093*** 
SPPC-1 -0,0332*** -0,0182 -0,0321*** 
N. Obs 266 266 266 
R2 0,1337 0,1482  
Model Test F value=40,7314 
p-value = 7,80e-10 
 
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
F value=1,4257 
p-value=0,1476 
Breusch-Pagan 
p-value= 0,693 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m value=2,9385 
p-value=0,0865 
Note: *, ** and ***, 
  
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Conditional Convergence 
 
While controlling for the steady state and trying to highlight the particular impact of 
the other chosen factors here, we consider several specifications, to control for the 
robustness of the estimates. The results from the implementation with no group 
effects, in explanation of social protection convergence are displayed in Tables 4 & 
5.  
 
In all specifications, the coefficient of the lagged by one year dependent variable 
being negative and significant confirms the hypothesis of conditional convergence, 
whereas this coefficient appears higher in the Pooled OLS specification (Table 4). 
Furthermore, the Dependency Ratio (with the exception of the Pooled OLS), 
unemployment rate and per capita GDP, enter the models simultaneously with 
significant coefficient with the expected sign. More specifically, the per capita GDP 
seems to have the most important and negative effect on the per capita social 
expenditure. Contrary, the coefficient of the unemployment rate (ΔUNEM) is 
positive and significant, proving that the needs for social transfers are sensitive to 
the state of the economic situation.  
 
Table 4. Conditional Social Convergence in EU-14, 1990-2009 
 
 Dependent variable: Δ_l_SPPC 
Independent variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
constant 0.2237*** 0.2732*** 0.2957*** 
SPPC-1 -0.0625*** -0.0282** -0.0308*** 
Δ2DR 0.0036 0.0059* 0.0367* 
ΔUNEM 0.0468** 0.0348*** 0.035*** 
Δ2GDP -0.1695* -0.2771*** -0.2577*** 
N. Obs  252  
Adj. R2 0.2785 0.2439  
Model Test F value=25.2261 
p-value =1.56e-17 
F Test for No Fixed 
Effects 
Breusch-Pagan 
p-value= 0.619 
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 F value=1.8229 
p-value=0.0405 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m value=2.2058 
p-value=0.698 
 Notes: Variables are expressed in log.*, ** and ***, 
  
denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels     respectively.  
 
Random effects are examined by the Breusch-Pagan test. As the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, the pooled OLS regression is favored. Also, Hausman test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between independent variable and 
error term, with the value m=2.2058. This means that the estimated coefficients in 
the random effect model are unbiased. 
 
In the fixed effect model, the result of F test for no fixed effect shows that the null 
hypothesis, which is that there are no fixed effects, is rejected at the 5% level, 
meaning that the pooled OLS model could be also biased because of the existing 
fixed effects. As a result, the fixed effect model, which is in the second column of 
the table below, was proved to be appropriate in this regression. 
 
In Table 5, the convergence in terms of SP expenditure as percentage of GDP is 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable.  
 
Table 5. Conditional Social Convergence in EU-14, 1990-2009 
 
 Dependent variable: Δ_l_SPGDP 
 
Independent variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
constant 0,1246*** 0.1691** 0.1715*** 
SPGDP-1 -0,0372*** -0.0513** -0.0188*** 
Δ2DR 0,0343* 0.0377* 0.0556** 
ΔUNEM 0,1271*** 0.1268*** 0.1194*** 
Δ2GDP -0,807*** -0.7933*** -0.8596*** 
N. Obs 252 252 252 
Adj. R2 0.4998 0.5028  
Model Test F value=63.6992 
p-value = 6.12e-37 
 
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
F value=1.1162 
p-value=0.3459 
Breusch-Pagan 
p-value= 0.7239 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m value=5.9436 
p-value=0,2034 
Note: Variables are expressed in log.*, ** and ***
 
denote significance at 1%, 5% at 
10% levels respectively.  
 
In all models, the explanatory variables enter the model with the expected sign and 
are statistically significant. More specifically, the rate of variation of the dependency 
ratio ΔRD carries a positive and significant incidence on the welfare expenditure 
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growth. The result is what one might expect insofar as the increase in this ratio takes 
into account both the pressure due to demographic aging and that related to the 
decline of the fertility rate in the majority of the European countries. In the same 
way, the coefficient of the unemployment rate (ΔUNEM) is positive and significant.  
Random effects are examined by the Breusch-Pagan test. As the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, the pooled OLS regression is favored. Also, Hausman test failing to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between independent variable 
and error term, with the value m= 2.2058. This means that the estimated coefficients 
in the random effect model are not biased. 
 
In the fixed effect model, the result of F test for no fixed effect shows that the null 
hypothesis of no fixed effects can’t be rejected at the 5% level, meaning that the 
pooled OLS model is unbiased and as such more appropriate in this regression. 
 
Accounting for Group and Time Effects 
 
These above results can be more deeply analyzed in the two next models, which 
account for group effects related to the different welfare states (Tables 6 and 7). 
Both models have been estimated using the fixed effect methodology through which 
we test the hypothesis that the effect of per capita GDP on welfare growth in per 
capita as well as percentage of GDP is different under different welfare regimes. In 
our specifications the fixed effect methodology is preferred to random effects for 
two reasons. First, since we utilize data from 14 particular EU countries, our 
observations cannot be treated as being a random sample from a large population. 
Thus, it seems more reasonable to consider that a separate intercept should be 
estimated for each country (Wooldridge, 2006). Second, in all of our regressions the 
null hypothesis that there is no correlation between independent variable and error 
term is rejected through Hausman test, suggesting that the fixed effect model is more 
appropriate. 
 
Here, looking at the parameter values, we note that independently of the indicator of 
SP taken in to account, a significant positive contribution to the growth in welfare 
expenditure of all the regimes is detected (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Panel Estimates: Group-Effects and Τime Effects 
 
 Dependent variable: Δ_l_SPPC 
Independent variable Fixed Effects Model 
Group effects Group and Time effects 
constant 0,3547* 0,3105* 
SPPC-1 -0,1678** -0,1619** 
DLPC 0,1988*** 0,196*** 
DSPC 0,1948*** 0,1965*** 
DSEPC 0,1639** 0,1608** 
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.          Note: *, ** and ***
 
denote significance at 1%, 5% at 10% levels respectively.  
 
However, this contribution is lower in the Southern Eastern European countries. In 
other words, “the country i which belongs to the Southern European group” 
increases less the expected welfare expenditure. This result allows us to say that 
each group posses its own institutions pattern, welfare policy and social demand for 
protection policy that define different dynamics within each of the four welfare 
regimes. This finding is also confirmed by the result of F test, where the hypothesis 
of no fixed effects is rejected at the 5% level. We next proceed by including a time 
dummy variable for the year 2008. The negative and significant coefficient of this 
variable indicates that the global crisis had a negative effect on the SP convergence 
process. However, this is not the case when the SP expenditure as percentage of 
GDP is considered, as the coefficient appears to be non significant.     
 
A second point to note is that when we consider the SP expenditure as percentage of 
GDP as a measure of Social Protection, the role of the variables that refer to the 
welfare regime appears to be very strong in the explanation of SP convergence 
process as it is indicated by the value of R
2 
(Table 7). More specifically, the 78.19% 
of the variation of the growth on the SP expenditure as percentage of GDP is 
explained by the lagged dependent variable and the variables welfare regimes, 
whereas the corresponding value in the case of the per capita SP growth is 
significantly lower (30.81%).   
 
Table 7. Panel Estimates: Group-Effects and Time-Effects 
 
Note: *, ** and ***
 
denote significance at 1%, 5% at 10% levels respectively.  
DUM 2008  -0,0102*** 
N. Obs 266 266 
Adj. R2 0,3081 0,3115 
Model Test F Test for No Fixed Effects 
F value= 5,654 
p-value= 4,7875e-009 
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
F value= 5,6348 
p-value= 5,25546e-009 
 Dependent variable:  Δ_l_SPGDP 
Independent variable Fixed Effects Model 
Group effects Group and Time effects 
constant 1,7689*** 1,7654*** 
SPGDP-1 -0,7360*** -0,7346*** 
DLGDP 0,0446*** 0,0445*** 
DSGDP 0,0281*** 0,0281*** 
DSEGDP 0,0377*** 0,0376*** 
DUM 2008  0,0034 
N. Obs 265 265 
Adj. R2 0,7819 0,7814 
Model Test F Test for No 
Fixed Effects 
F Value=  69,8721 
p-value=  6,18046e-075 
F Test for No 
Fixed Effects 
F Value=  68,5338 
p-value=   5,61867e-074 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this paper was to analyze the issue of social convergence in the 
European Union. Examination of the dynamics of social protection expenditure in 
the Southern-EU4 countries and the Northern-EU10 countries, revealed two distinct 
patterns of movement of the social expenditures, as a percentage of GDP. To check 
for the robustness of our results we used panel data techniques.  
 
With the exception of the Fixed Effects specification, evidence of absolute β-
convergence was found independently of the indicator considered. To test for the 
conditional social convergence hypothesis, we proceed by taking into account a 
number of factors that may influence the convergence process. Our results confirm 
that the social convergence process, both in per capita and in percentage of GDP 
terms, indeed occurred over the period 1990-2009. More specifically, the 
unemployment and the dependency ratio, appear to exhibit a significant positive 
impact on the welfare convergence.  
 
In contrast, the economic growth appears to exhibit a significant negative impact on 
the social protection expenditure growth.  
In the next step, our results were deeply analyzed, by means of the Fixed Effects 
specification, accounting for the group effects related to the different welfare 
regimes. Thus, it seems that each group posses its own institutions’ pattern, welfare 
policy and social demand for protection policy, that indeed define different 
dynamics within each of the four welfare regimes. 
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